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INTRODUCTION 
South Africa and, more tentatively, Northern Ireland are emerging from bitter ethno-
national conflicts in which violence and crime characterized the transition to peaceful 
political settlements. The collapse of apartheid in 1989, lifting the 30-year ban on the 
African National Congress (ANC) and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela, created 
a climate for political negotiation and change in South Africa. This paved the way for an 
interim constitution, the first multi-racial democratic elections in 1994 and led to the 
Government of National Unity.  The ANC’s success in the most recent elections (June 
1999) gave the party an overwhelming mandate to accelerate Thabo Mbeki’s program of 
“transformation” aimed at tackling the significant socio-economic problems facing South 
Africa: unemployment, AIDS, crime and education. The legacy of political resistance, 
often violent, deployed to make the townships ungovernable during apartheid has created 
a culture tolerant of citizens taking the law into their own hands. Although the number of 
political killings (killings arising out of the conflict between different political factions) 
dropped sharply from about 2,500 in 1994 to fewer than 500 in 1997, 1 Mbeki in his 
inauguration speech in Pretoria (16 June 1999) regretted that some South Africans were 
“forced to beg, rob and murder to ensure that they and their own do not perish from 
hunger.” 2  The savagery of the crime wave is however captured in reports that one in 
every two South African women will be raped during their lifetime, the average South 
African is eight times more likely to be murdered than the average American, and one 
policeman is killed each day - 1,400 have died since the ANC came to power. 3  The 
public response is that “brutality should be met with brutality. The rich surround 
themselves with razor wire and private security guards, and the poor resort to 
vigilantism.” 4 
Northern Ireland’s transition to “peace” has been more recent and capricious. The signing 
of the Belfast Agreement 5 in April 1998 and its subsequent endorsement in referenda by 
its electorate (71.2 percent) and voters in the Irish Republic (94 percent) heralded a 
political solution to the seemingly intractable problems which bedevilled the province for 
30 years. 6  The British and Irish governments formally resolved their historical 
differences through the general and mutual acceptance of the principle of consent - 
Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, and will remain so, as long as a majority 
wishes. The Irish constitution (articles 2 and 3) was amended to reflect this understanding 
and power was devolved (December 1999) to a locally elected Northern Ireland 
Assembly with a wide range of executive and legislative powers. The agreement also 
contained measures designed to create a “normal and peaceful society in Northern 
Ireland.”  The most significant included the early release of political prisoners, parallel 
reviews of the policing and criminal justice systems, new independent Human Rights and 
Equality Commissions and a commitment from participants to total disarmament of all 
paramilitary organizations by working with the independent International Body on 
Decommissioning.  Failure to resolve the arms issue (prosaically described as “no guns, 
no government”) led to the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive 
on 12 February 2000, a political impasse and the re-imposition of Direct Rule from 
Westminster.  
The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland recently claimed “the guns are silent and the 
IRA’s cease-fire has, on the whole, held for over two and a half years.” 7  Even though 
the Omagh bomb (15 August 1998) constituted the worst terrorist atrocity in Northern 
Ireland in which 29 people died and 200 were injured, in 1999 seven civilians were 
killed, the lowest figure since the “troubles” began, and the first year ever that no security 
forces were murdered. This, however, conceals an ongoing level of violence perpetrated 
by paramilitaries through “punishment” attacks, beatings and shootings in their role as 
community “protectors” upholding the law in areas they control. Up to the end of 1999 
police statistics show there have been 2,241 shootings and 1,560 beatings since the 
figures were first recorded. 8  These statistics, however, are thought to under-estimate the 
true extent of the problem. Those subjected to beatings and shootings are fearful of 
involving the security forces in case of paramilitary reprisal and hence there is large scale 
under-reporting. The current political vacuum has led to a significant increase in the 
number of beatings and shootings. During the Mitchell review 9 of the implementation of 
the Belfast Agreement (September 1999), Sinn Féin stated the importance of the political 
process in making conflict a thing of the past, accepted decommissioning (the hand over 
or verified disposal of paramilitary held weapons) as an essential part of the agreement, 
and opposed the use of force and “punishment” attacks. 10  This resulted in the cessation 
of republican paramilitary shootings until the suspension of the Assembly, at which point 
they recommenced. 
This brief overview of the two countries suggests several things. First, communities, 
which have been brutalized during conflicts over a long period, become desensitized to 
violent crime. In the case of Northern Ireland this has been variously described by a 
former Secretary of State as “the peace we have now is imperfect, but better than none” 
or perhaps, more tersely, as having “an acceptable level of violence.” 11  Second, within 
conflict settings crime can be differentiated into “political” and “normal” crime. The 
former could include informing and collaborating with the “enemy” even though such 
activities would not necessarily be deemed as criminal by the state. In contrast, “normal” 
crime would include break-ins, muggings, rape, car theft, drug-dealing etc., all of which 
would be considered as criminal by the state and necessitating action by the formal 
justice system. When the legitimacy of the state and its organs (the security forces and 
legal system) are integral to the nature of the conflict, however, this forecloses recourse 
to the normal channels by which communities seek to tackle “normal” crime. Third, and 
as a direct consequence, communities develop their own response to crime that will be 
heavily influenced by the violent environment within which they live. 
This article, drawing on focus group interview material, will therefore examine ways in 
which the communities in Northern Ireland and South Africa have responded to crime 
both during the conflict and thereafter. If the raison d’ tre for “political” crime has been 
removed once a negotiated settlement is reached and the legitimacy of the state 
reaffirmed by agreement, can communities then subscribe to the formal system of 
criminal justice?  Given the relatively recent, albeit fragile, arrival of a “peace” 
settlement to Northern Ireland the article considers what lessons, if any, can be learned 
from the South African post-conflict experience and its efforts to deal with community 12 
responses to crime. 
Crime in Northern Ireland and South Africa 
The Northern Ireland security forces have prided themselves on having a lower rate of 
“ordinary” crime than other parts of the United Kingdom, even allowing for evidence of 
under-reporting particularly among republicans. 13  In 1994, for example, Northern 
Ireland had a lower crime rate than in any of the 43 police forces in England and Wales. 
Figures from the 1998 Northern Ireland Crime Survey show lower levels of crimes 
against the household than the equivalent British Crime Survey (23 percent and 34 
percent respectively). In the case of violent crimes against the person, the figures between 
the two regions are very similar: 4.7 percent of British Crime Survey respondents, 
compared to 4.4 percent in Northern Ireland, said they had been a victim of violence. 14 
This contrasts starkly with a report by the Police Authority for Northern Ireland 15 which 
monitored the performance of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 16 during 1998/99 
and found “that many categories of crime are on the increase while police performance in 
tackling this has not always been as effective as anticipated.” 17  The report notes that the 
number of violent crimes 18 rose by 21.2 percent, recorded crimes increased by 27.9 
percent and crimes against the person went up by 33.2 percent.  These figures were 
confirmed by a Home Office report on international crime statistics, which showed that 
Northern Ireland’s percentage increase (28 percent) in recorded crime was second only to 
South Africa where it rose by 37 percent in 1998. Northern Ireland also experienced the 
largest rise of the 29 countries examined in the report in the area of recorded violent 
crime, with an increase of 21 percent, while England and Wales, and Ireland recorded 
decreases of 6 percent and 17 percent respectively. 19 One explanation suggested by the 
Northern Ireland Police Authority was that reduced levels of security force activity 
provide greater opportunity for criminals. 
The parallels with South Africa are outlined by one observer: 
The province could be risking a surge in non-political organised crime, as members on 
both sides of the sectarian divide exploit the weaknesses of peacetime policing. Urban 
guerrilla movements such as the African National Congress’s Umkontho we Sizwe, the 
Ulster Volunteer Force and the IRA have routinely resorted to bank robbery, protection 
rackets, and smuggling to fund their military campaigns against the ruling power. When, 
as was the case in South Africa, the movement becomes the dominant political force, 
many of its former operatives find themselves unable to adjust to life on the side of the 
law. Instead, they stay in the shadows, and sometimes join forces in lawlessness with the 
very men who, when they served apartheid’s police structures, were given the task of 
fighting them. 20  
South Africa has been described as a “crimo-generic society,” the origins of which can be 
traced to its apartheid past. 21  Transgressions of pass laws were classified as crime and 
those involved in the liberation struggle justified the use of violence as a legitimate 
means to an end. Subsequently, politics and crime have been closely interlinked. Police 
figures show that crime had actually begun to increase in the decade prior to the ending 
of apartheid (1980-1990), when for example, murders increased by 32 percent, rape by 24 
percent and burglary by 31 percent. 22  In the post-apartheid era, crime has continued to 
rise.  In the period between 1990 and 1997, police data for the number of recorded crimes 
to the person showed a dramatic increase. For example, assaults rose by 89 percent, rapes 
by 157 percent and robbery by 100 percent. For the same period, the number of recorded 
crimes to property also increased, where house-breakings were up 50 percent and theft of 
motor vehicles by 47 percent. 23  The only crime to have experienced a decrease is that of 
murder, which is due to declining levels of political violence. As Mark Shaw notes,  
Increases in crime from 1990 are consistent with the experiences of other countries 
undergoing transition to democracy: as change proceeds, society and its instruments of 
social control B formal and informal - are reshaped. The result is that new areas for the 
development of crime, which are bolstered by the legacies of the past, open up. 24 
What appears to have happened in Northern Ireland as the conflict developed is that the 
boundaries between so called “normal” and “political” crime have become blurred, 
leading to community frustration with the formal system of criminal justice yet, at the 
same time, fear of the influence exerted by paramilitaries. Questions are now being asked 
as to whether these erstwhile community protectors have become oppressors and what, if 
any, is their ongoing role in an era of “peace.”  We now examine in some detail the 
response of communities to crime during the conflict. 
Community Response to Crime in Northern Ireland 
Paramilitaries in republican areas of Northern Ireland have assumed the role of 
community “police” from the very beginning of the “troubles” in what they describe as 
the absence of a legitimate police service. 25 Not only do they see the RUC as an 
instrument of the British state, which they do not recognize in Northern Ireland, but point 
to such failings as its religious composition (8 percent Catholic from a 40 percent 
population) and treatment of the minority community. 26  They cite cases such as Robert 
Hamill, beaten to death by a loyalist 27 mob and witnessed by police who allegedly failed 
to intervene.  They claim RUC collusion with loyalist paramilitaries, most notably in 
killings of high profile nationalist/republican figures, such as human rights lawyer 
Rosemary Nelson and solicitor Pat Finucane, and accuse the police of exploiting young 
petty offenders for intelligence information gathering. In contrast, within the loyalist 
communities, the RUC are seen as legitimate but ineffectual, part of a system of criminal 
justice which cannot react quickly enough and exact retribution deemed appropriate by 
victims of crime. Pat Conway 28 points to significant differences in loyalist and 
republican policing. In the former he suggests they are more involved in policing their 
own organizations for reasons such as internal disputes and informing. Young people 
involved in anti-social crime, rather than being marginalized, are often persuaded to 
either “join-up” or, at the very least, contribute part of the proceeds of their criminal 
activity to the paramilitaries. 
Communities have turned to paramilitaries for protection against crimes committed in the 
areas they control. Typically these will include burglary, car theft and joy-riding, drug 
dealing and more generally what is described as “anti-social behaviour” against the 
community or “hooding.” Officially, when community members complain an 
investigation is carried out and, if substantiated, followed up by a “punishment” 
graduated on a scale or a tariff system consistent with the seriousness of the “crime.”  
This can range from warnings, threats, curfew, beatings, shootings, exiling and ultimately 
execution. 29  In practice, however, blame and guilt may be established through little 
more than hearsay and the level of “punishment” can be arbitrarily brutal or lenient, 
depending upon whether the accused “is connected” (related or linked in some way) to 
known paramilitaries. Beatings are carried out using weapons such as baseball bats, golf 
clubs, pickaxe handles, drills, iron bars, hammers and hurley sticks spiked with nails to 
inflict puncture wounds.  
Community endorsement and support for the system is outlined by two interviewees: 
The RUC don’t come into our areas so we have to look to the republican movement for 
policing. Because we don’t have cells to lock offenders up, the system evolved from 
there. In the ‘70s they dropped breezeblocks on them and nobody complained. As a 
matter of fact, I don’t think they are doing enough to them now. 
No person will go to the RUC. They will either go to representatives of Sinn Féin, 
community representatives or members of the IRA to actually get it dealt with. If 
somebody’s caught joyriding in the area, they’re going to face the courts, probably get 
out on bail, more likely get a suspended sentence, and they’re free to go out again, start 
joyriding, terrorising the community again. If they go through the informal system, action 
will be taken immediately, whether it’s exiling, their legs broke[n] or kneecapped. That’s 
tackling the problem, getting to its core. 30  
All of this ignores available evidence that a number of people have been mistakenly 
identified by “punishment” gangs who perpetrate these criminal acts, boys as young as 13 
years old hospitalized through paramilitary beatings, and the process used to settle 
grudges or internal feuds, euphemistically described as “housekeeping” issues.  The 
police tacitly acquiesce in a system which they know to exist and can exploit for 
intelligence gathering (“informing” from another perspective), particularly given the 
vulnerabilities of many of the young people targeted by paramilitaries.  Hence 
communities are caught in a trap.  Even though the Northern Ireland conflict reached a 
political and constitutional resolution through the Belfast Agreement, the associated 
reforms of the police and criminal justice systems have not yet happened. A hiatus 
therefore exists.  In republican areas the RUC are anathema and communities still look to 
paramilitaries for community “protection,” yet their political leadership gave a 
commitment to the Mitchell principles of democracy and non-violence. 31 In loyalist 
areas, which are much more factional in their paramilitary make-up and therefore less 
ideologically homogeneous, there is a more irregular approach to community “justice.” 
This is best illustrated by a comment from one interviewee in a loyalist area: 
Quite frankly, I don’t want the paramilitaries to deal with anything. I want the police to 
have power to look after the community. As far as I’m concerned the paramilitaries have 
no place in Northern Ireland. I mean they were set up to protect one side and fight the 
other side. Well that’s done. We’ve got peace now. They’re big business. They’re hiding 
behind this paramilitary protection and all this, but really they are extortionists into fraud 
and drugs. There’s no place for them. They’re kneecapping a young lad for 
housebreaking yet they are holding up post offices and banks. 32  
This remark traces the shift in community feelings from a stage when paramilitaries were 
seen to have a legitimate role to play in a conflict scenario. In these circumstances 
communities were prepared to overlook racketeering, choosing to believe that this was 
necessary to fund the ongoing “struggle.” As “peace” developed they have become 
intolerant, yet no less fearful, of the role played by paramilitaries. The line between 
“ordinary” crime and “political” crime is indistinct and a frustration is palpable that the 
formal system of criminal justice has been unable to keep pace with this shift in the 
attitudes of communities. An international report on armed groups recently argued that 
“the distinction between politically motivated action and organised crime is fading away. 
All too often, the political objectives are unclear, if not subsidiary to the crimes 
perpetrated while allegedly waging one’s struggle.” 33  This is particularly apposite in the 
case of loyalist paramilitaries whose political objectives might broadly be defined as 
defenders of the Union but, in practice, they have been the countervailing forces to IRA 
violence. With the Union secured and the IRA maintaining a ceasefire, their current role 
is being questioned by those they claim to protect.  In a situation where police reforms 
have yet to be implemented and the outcome of the criminal justice review has just been 
published, how then do communities deal with crime?  
Crime in the Transitional Period 
In this fluid political scenario republican paramilitaries, under pressure from Sinn Féin 
who must demonstrate their democratic credentials, have given their support to the 
concept of community restorative justice (CRJ) schemes. Restorative justice, based on 
some form of victim-offender mediation, seeks to move away from the traditional 
retributive system of punishing the offender for crimes committed. It attempts to restore 
and repair relationships between the offender, the victim and the community. Therein 
victims are given the chance to say how the crime affected them, the offender is 
confronted with the distress he/she caused, given the opportunity to make amends and 
offered a way of reintegrating into the community. 34  The impetus for republican 
endorsement of this approach came via a report produced by academics and criminal 
justice practitioners who designed a restorative justice system appropriate for local 
circumstances. 35 It presented a workable model comprising referral, investigation, 
informal caution, informal mediation, formal mediation, hearing and “solutions” or 
“disposals” (e.g. restitution of damage, referral to a statutory agency, community service 
and community boycott). This approach has been enthusiastically embraced in many 
republican and nationalist areas (Derry and west and north Belfast) with demand 
outstripping the capacity of CRJ activists to deliver. The principles of restorative justice 
have also found support in the government’s own review of criminal justice in which they 
argue “it is necessary to find a means of mobilising local opinion against vigilantes and 
violence” but “it must be in partnership with, rather than as an alternative to, the official 
systems.” 36 
Therein lies the problem. Community restorative justice schemes in republican areas do 
not recognize the RUC as integral to the process and critics have branded their approach 
as nothing more than a cover for a “Provo police force.” 37 This has prompted questions 
from Unionist politicians about their long-term role. David Trimble, for example, asked 
Adam Ingram, the Security Minister the following parliamentary question: 
Does the Minister agree that some of the restorative justice schemes that are operating in 
Northern Ireland could be accurately described as alternative justice schemes? Does he 
also agree that those schemes are operating wholly outside the legal system and involve 
significant abuse of the rights of the people who are caught up within them? 38 
The Minister responded: 
Some schemes clearly do not conform to what is desirable, do not recognise the police 
and, indeed, may not even recognise the due process of law. Such schemes do not fall 
within the ambit of restorative justice but of a different type of civil administration and 
are, therefore, unacceptable. 39 
Others are generally critical of the whole restorative justice approach. Mike Brogden, 40 
for example, questions the detail of its implementation. Most sanctions, he argues depend 
on “shaming” the offender and reintegration into society. The shaming process requires 
community solidarity not present in Northern Ireland. He also queries what happens to 
the offender who refuses to accept the legitimacy of the community court and/or the 
penalty handed down. He concludes that “as an alternative to “punishment” beatings and 
the inefficiencies of the formal system, it is welcome. But restorative justice is also 
ineffectual. For most part, it represents a road to nowhere.” 41  
Loyalists have also become involved in restorative justice, most notably through a 
program entitled the Greater Shankill Alternatives. The scheme commenced in 1998 as a 
direct response to paramilitary “punishment” attacks. The concept of restorative justice is 
not as widespread and less well-known in loyalist areas. Our focus group participants in 
the Shankill area, for example, had “only vaguely heard of the Alternatives project.”  It is 
also more difficult to secure the endorsement of loyalist paramilitaries for restorative 
justice given their factionalism. What is interesting, however, is that those involved in the 
program grouped “punishment” attacks into three categories: those carried out by 
paramilitaries on their own members for internal disciplinary matters; those involved in 
anti-social activities; and feuds between groupings involved with the sale of drugs. In the 
latter it was argued, with some circumspection, that “these are not in themselves 
paramilitary groupings, although there could at times be an overlap in membership.” 42 
Based on this analysis, the community restorative justice project opted to restrict its 
involvement to anti-social activities. Since then, according to those involved, its work has 
widened to include “socially harmful activities, empowerment of the local community, 
and areas of weakness within the formal criminal justice system.” 43 Aside from the more 
limited geographical coverage of restorative justice in loyalist areas, activists claim police 
cooperation. Republicans contest the nature and extent of this and see it as duplicitous to 
secure government funding. Their criticisms are, in part, a reaction to their own largely 
unsuccessful efforts to gain access to public sector resources which they argue are being 
vetoed by the Northern Ireland Office. 
A key element within the Belfast Agreement was a proposal to reform the existing 
policing and criminal justice systems. Participating political parties felt the agreement 
“provides the opportunity for a new beginning to policing in Northern Ireland with a 
police service capable of attracting and sustaining support from the community as a 
whole.” 44 In view of the contentious and highly emotive nature of policing, an 
independent commission (chaired by Chris Patten) was established to design “a police 
service that can enjoy widespread support from, and is seen to be an integral part of, the 
community as a whole.” The Independent Commission reported in September 1999 and 
recommended, inter alia:  
•        A commitment via oath by all officers touphold human rights. 
•       The creation of a new Policing Board(replacing the present Police Authority) to 
hold the Chief Constable and policeservice publicly to account. Its 19-member 
composition would include 10cross-party Assembly representatives and nine 
independents from the business,voluntary and community and legal sectors. The Policing 
Board would have thepower to require the Chief Constable to report on any issue 
pertaining to theperformance of his/her functions or those of the police service. The 
obligationto report would extend to explaining operational decisions. 
•       At the local level each district councilwould establish a District Policing Partnership 
Board with a majority electedmembership and independents. The District Police 
Commander would meet with thePartnership Board, present reports and answer questions 
about community concernsand policing priorities. The local boards would have an 
additional communitysafety role with powers to purchase services on top of normal 
policing. 
•       A reduction in the size of the RUC’s13,000 officers to 7,500 and a recruitment 
profile of 50/50 Protestant/Catholicover a 10 year period. 
•       A change of name from the Royal UlsterConstabulary to the Northern Ireland 
Police Service and the adoption of a newbadge and symbols which were entirely free 
from any association with either theBritish or Irish States. 
Unionists reacted to Patten with hostility, accusing the Secretary of Stateof “politicising 
the RUC, not only by taking away the good name, but alsoremoving the independent 
Police Authority and placing a future police serviceunder a Board controlled by 
politicians.”45They see the reform process as the symbolic cleansingof the RUC’s 
association with the crown and now demand a moratorium on policereform until the IRA 
moves on arms decommissioning. Nationalists, for theirpart, criticized the government 
for diluting Patten’s proposals on policeaccountability in order to appease Ulster 
Unionists’ concerns, ensure thesurvival of David Trimble and copper-fasten the UUP’s 
(Ulster Unionist Party)commitment to power-sharing with Sinn Féin. Gerry Adams, in 
turn, pointed outthat the legislation did not remove the Unionist ethos and emblems nor 
providereal democratic accountability. The potential for policing reforms to 
restoreconfidence in the short-term within alienated loyalist and republicancommunities 
is limited. The medium to long-term prospect is more difficult topredict. 
The dilemma facing communities is obvious. “Normal” crime is increasing andthe 
rationale for “political” crime waning. The transition to “peace” hasexposed the activities 
of paramilitaries, especially in loyalist areas, ascommunity oppressors rather than 
defenders of a cause which has been overtakenby political events. Yet it will take some 
time for the necessary changes in thepolicing and criminal justice system to be put in 
place, and even longer for thecommunities to have confidence in them. To whom do 
working class people turnwhen faced with criminal activities that blight their lives?  The 
apparent support by paramilitaries for communityrestorative justice schemes may be no 
more than a cynical response on their partto keep their political representatives involved 
in the democratic process.There is evidence that they can initiate and discontinue 
“punishment” beatingsand shootings at will. To cede responsibility for law and order to 
the formalcriminal justice system would be to loose control within their communities 
wherethey have some social standing and exercise patronage (the “hard men” image). 
The expectations of the communities, however, are also important here. Theirexperience 
is one of living in a conflict setting for 30 years where their majorrecourse to the “law” 
was through the paramilitaries who administered “justice”expeditiously and often 
through the use of violence. John Brewer et al46have argued that civil unrest has, in fact, 
been acontributory factor to the survival of community structures - those under 
attackhave been strengthened as a consequence. Their expectations of the formalsystem, 
even a reformed one, based on this experience will be difficult tofulfil. Brutalized 
communities have become tolerant of rough “justice.” Onecommentator on South Africa 
remarked “our high rates of criminal violence, roadtraffic deaths, domestic violence, rape 
and child abuse are all obliqueexpressions of the brutality that is embedded in this 
society.”47The same is true in Northern Ireland. This questioningof the role now played 
by paramilitaries has not provided the communities withany obvious answers to tackling 
crime. As one interviewee put it: 
We’ve been brainwashed over the years. Whenever you heard of a “punishment”shooting 
or beating the first thing came into your head was “what did they do,they must have done 
something” because we placed so much faith and trust in theparamilitaries. Now I would 
put a question mark over these things but in ourarea the attitude is “well it hasn’t come to 
my door, I’m sorry for you but aslong as they leave mine alone.”48
Given Northern Ireland’s transitional status to a post-conflict society, whatlessons, if any, 
can be learned from the experience of South Africa in thecommunity’s response to 
crime? 
Community Response to Crime in South Africa 
Prior to the peace process in South Africa, the police and criminal justicesystem were 
viewed by large sections of the population as being not onlyillegitimate but also tools of 
the repressive apartheid state. The police wereconcerned with policing the apartheid laws, 
crushing resistance, recruitinginformers and supporting vigilante groups rather than 
combating crime. Inaddition, the courts were busy enforcing apartheid legislation instead 
of tryingalleged criminals and incarcerating those found guilty of crimes such as rapeand 
murder. Thus the townships in many areas were devoid of a police presence,and a dispute 
settlement/policing vacuum emerged. Subsequently, townshipinhabitants developed 
informal criminal justice mechanisms for dealing withcrime in their community. These 
mechanisms were developed, in part, fromtraditional rural practices such as the 
lekgotla,49which emphasized the restoration of harmony and there-integration of 
offenders into the community. Sentences handed down to thosefound guilty included 
fines, corporal punishment and community service.Neighbourhood patrols and street 
committees were also established in an attemptto deal with such “normal” crime as 
robbery, theft and rape. With the emergenceof the politicized youth or “comrades,” 
people’s courts were established withinthe townships and residents were encouraged to 
take their problems to the“comrades.” These courts were seen as part of the political 
struggle againstapartheid as they represented an alternative to the state structure and 
dealtwith both “normal” and “political” crime. They advocated discipline,organizational 
accountability, recognition of the “true enemy” (the state andits surrogates), and an 
understanding of the damage that crimes against theoppressed caused, namely, that they 
were divisive and counter-productive to thestruggle. Those found guilty by the people’s 
courts were often given punishmentsof a community service nature, such as painting an 
old person’s house or tidyinghis or her yard, a fine or, in more serious cases, limited 
physical punishmentwith a sjambok (whip). As Wilfred Schärf and Baba Ngcokoto note, 
“the main aimof such exercises in 'people’s justice' was to show the wrongdoers that they 
hadnot been abandoned by their community.”50 Gradually these courts, which numbered 
some 400 by1987, began to acquire the reputation of “kangaroo courts.”51Given that 
these courts were characterized by apredetermined assumption of guilt of the accused, 
and instant redress, it isunsurprising that they often engaged in human rights abuses. The 
people’s courtsof the “comrades” in some cases meted out beatings and whippings with a 
sjambok,with sentences of up to 300 lashes, and occasionally they passed a 
deathsentence. By the mid-1980s, those individuals accused of “political” crimes,such as 
collaboration, informing or being a “sell-out” (working as a councilloror a police officer) 
were “necklaced” for their alleged crimes. The necklacemethod involves the placing of a 
petrol-filled tyre around the accused’s neckthat is then set alight. Estimates suggest that 
between 1985 and 1990 some 350to 400 people were killed by this method of execution 
with a further 500necklaced between 1990 and 1994.52
Not everyone within the townships supported the anti-apartheid struggle andby the mid-
1980s vigilante groups in opposition to the “comrades” and supportiveof the status quo 
had emerged. Such groups were violent, organized and receivedvarying degrees of police 
support. Members included local élites includingbusinessmen, elders and their supporters, 
urban gangsters and police personnel.53These vigilantes only responded to “political” 
crime,which was defined broadly as any action against the apartheid state. Theiractivities 
included physical attacks on individuals and the destruction ofdwellings.  By 1988, more 
than 90 percent ofunrest related deaths were attributed to vigilante violence and some 6 to 
7,000people had died by 1992 as a result of such attacks.54
The various mechanisms developed by the township inhabitants to counter crimewithin 
their areas received varying degrees of community support and legitimacy.Like the 
makgotla before them, the people’s courts of the “comrades” lostsupport when their 
methods and punishments became more arbitrary and violent. AsMike Brogden and 
Clifford Shearing note, “township ordering processes could onlywork effectively as long 
as they were regarded as legitimate by all those whoappeared before them - or dared not 
resort to the state system.”55With the ending of apartheid and the negotiation ofa political 
settlement, the question arose as to whether community responses tocrime would 
continue in the “new” South Africa? 
Crime in the Post-Conflict Era 
In the years leading up to South Africa’s first multi-racial democraticelections the 
country experienced both a decline in overt political violence anda dramatic rise in 
“normal” crime. Figures for the transition years of 1990 to1994 show a 7 percent 
decrease in the murder rate but increases in rape (42percent), robbery (40 percent), 
vehicle theft (34 percent) and burglary (20percent).56In the same period, people’s courts 
continued tooperate and employ varying degrees of punishment. For example, in Nyanga 
(nearCape Town) two men were given a 100 lashes for stealing a pair of shoes57while in 
Mamelodi (near Pretoria) a newspaper reporterwas sentenced to 500 lashes for writing 
about the township’s informal courts.58Given the reputation of people’s courts for 
brutalityand summary justice, anti-crime committees have been set up within a number 
oftownships. In some areas training programs have been developed and 
operationalguidelines issued. The committees have had varied success.59Furthermore, 
non-violent community courts have alsobeen established. These courts, or forums as they 
are frequently known, operatea restorative justice philosophy echoing the practices of the 
makgotla and seekto involve the community directly in the resolution of disputes and 
problems.Punishments are non-physical and incorporate an element of shaming. A 
communityforum co-ordinator explains how this is done to those found guilty: 
We educate them so that they respect the community, . . . it’s not apunishment where 
people are sjambokked, it’s education where people getthemselves embarrassed. [W]hen 
people come from work, they want to see thepeople who have been punished by the court 
. . ..  So people like to see them .. . [and] if they see you there they will laugh at you. 
Everybody will know hewas a thief, or whatever.60  
The democratic elections of 1994 saw the formation of a new government, onethat was 
finally recognized by the majority of the population of South Africa asbeing the 
legitimate government of the people. This (new) government inheritedits predecessor’s 
structures of law and order. Subsequently, it has attempted toaddress the problems of 
illegitimacy and accountability within the criminaljustice system. In 1995, the South 
African Police Service Act61was passed. This act not only renamed the police butalso 
envisaged their transformation into a public service provider. It alsoallowed for greater 
civilian oversight and community cooperation with the policethrough the creation of 
Community Police Forums. Within the magistrate’s courtsystem, lay assessors drawn 
from the community have been introduced therebygiving the community a greater say in 
the sentencing of those found guilty ofcrime. More recently, the Law Commission62has 
begun to explore the possibility of not onlyrecognizing the informal community court 
structures that operate a restorativejustice approach in the townships, but also 
incorporating them into the formalsystem. It should be noted that these reforms have not 
resulted in theeradication of informal justice in the townships. Indeed, there has been 
agrowth in extra-state mechanisms of law and order together with a decliningconfidence 
in the state to provide a safe and secure environment. High crimerates, perceived police 
ineffectiveness and alleged corruption within thecriminal justice system have all 
contributed to the continued existence ofretributive informal justice. To those who can 
afford it the private securityindustry now provides safety and security for a fee. It is 
estimated that theprivate security industry is worth more than R9bn (approximately 
US$1.145bn) andthat the ratio of private security personnel to uniformed police officers 
isfour to one.63Those communities who cannot afford this alternativeprotection have to 
rely on their own initiatives. The “comrades” are no longerinvolved in anti-crime 
activities; rather new groups have emerged that includePeninsula Anti-Crime Agency 
(PEACA)64in the Western Cape, Mapogo a Mathamaga65in the Northern Province and the 
willingness of taxiassociations in some townships to become involved in crime solving 
for a fee.Furthermore, in some cases spontaneous mobs form to mete out justice to 
allegedcriminals. All of these groups stand accused of using corporal punishment 
andviolence in responding to crime. Indeed Mapogo’s leader, John Magolego, assertsthat 
public flogging, “is the African way of stopping crime. The criminal mustlie on the 
ground, and we must work on his buttocks and put him right.”66Alleged suspects are 
usually beaten until they confessor provide information as to the whereabouts of stolen 
goods.  Mapogo has alsobeen accused of throwing suspects into crocodile-infested 
waters, whiletaxi-drivers in Guguletu are implicated in dragging alleged criminals 
behindvehicles. 
To the inhabitants of the townships, the kangaroo courts of the taxiassociations or justice 
of the mob are the only effective source of crimecontrol and justice available to them. 
The police and criminal justice system,although accepted as legitimate, are perceived as 
ineffective, cumbersome and insome instances corrupt. The anti-crime activities of the 
taxi-drivers inGuguletu were seen by many residents as an effective crime control 
measure; notonly were goods and monies retrieved and the alleged criminal dealt with, 
butthe actions of the taxi-drivers were viewed as a deterrent to other criminals inthe area. 
Crime figures cited in the Cape Times for the first month of thetaxi-drivers’ actions show 
a decrease in theft (21 percent), murder (56 percent)and housebreaking (24 percent) in the 
area.67 Superintendent Conradie, head of crime prevention atGuguletu Police Station, 
while condemning the taxi-drivers’ methods,acknowledged that crime had risen since 
their anti-crime activities had stopped:“After these people of the taxis were arrested, 
immediately there was anenormous lot of robberies especially with firearms and the taxi 
people reallymade a difference.”68Community endorsement and support for the taxi-
driversare outlined by two interviewees: 
You have just bought a new microwave, a new fridge and so on. Perhaps you goto work, 
the kids go to school, you come back later during the day andeverything is gone and it’s 
quite a difficult situation. You have seen the taxipeople working. They were able to catch 
the thief, bring back the stolen goods.So you are obviously driven towards the taxi people 
to ask for help. Immediatelythey have picked up the individual and the individual has 
dished out thenecessary information in terms of where the goods are. The taxi people go 
beyondthat to the extent of perhaps killing the person, and that leaves the 
communityspirit crushed. 
People go to the taxis because they are looking for a quick fix, because thepolice is a long 
road that can take years. The taxis, you go now and you getyour stuff in the afternoon, 
and the case is solved, everything.69
In addition to the developments in the black townships, an organizedvigilante group has 
also emerged from within the coloured and predominantlyMuslim community living in 
the Western Cape. This community lives predominantlyin the townships of the Cape 
Flats, which are characterized by the existence ofgangs. Some of these gangs have long 
histories and it is estimated that thereare up to 80,000 active gang members in the Cape 
belonging to some 137 gangs.70Crime, including murder, rape and drug abuse, aredaily 
experiences for the people living and working in these townships. PeopleAgainst 
Gangsterism And Drugs (PAGAD) was established toward the end of 1995 
andarticulated a number of stated aims and objectives: 
•       to propagate the eradication of drugs and gangsterism from society; 
•       to cooperate with, and to coordinate the activities of similar mindedpeople and 
groups; 
•       to encourage the incorporation of these people and other groups intoPAGAD’s 
campaign; 
•       to generate funds to realize their stated aims.71
PAGAD acknowledges that it holds large-scale public meetings and protests,stages 
marches to the homes of alleged drug dealers and gangsters, and issueswarnings and 
ultimatums to individuals involved in drugs and gang-related crime.However, the 
organization denies that it is involved in drive-by shootings,petrol and pipe-bombings and 
other shootings, although its members were capturedon film shooting and then setting 
alight Rashaad Staggie, a leader of the “HardLivings” gang in August 1996. Individuals 
who have dared to criticize PAGAD’smethods have also been targeted. For example, Dr 
Ebrahim Moosa, an academic atthe University of Cape Town, had his home bombed after 
criticizing theirvigilante tactics on the Muslim radio station Radio 786. A leaked 
militaryintelligence report suggests that between March and July 1998 PAGAD targeted 
86alleged drug dealers and succeeded in killing 24.72  Furthermore, thepolice attribute 
188 out of the 667 violent attacks recorded in Cape Town in1998 to PAGAD, and 
arrested 28 suspects with links to the organization.73Its members have been charged with 
a range ofoffences, including sedition, murder, attempted murder, possession of 
illegalfirearms, malicious damage to property and public violence. Initially, 
PAGADreceived backing from the Muslim community; support rose from around 6,000 
inMay 1996 to 100,000 in the following year.74An Institute for Democracy in South 
Africa (IDASA)survey in September 1996 found that nearly one-third of those surveyed 
supportedPAGAD.75 However, more recently original supporters, includingindividuals 
and Muslim groups, have begun to distance themselves from theorganization. The Safety 
and Security Minister, Steve Tshwete, regards PAGAD as“terrorists, pure and simple.”76 
The state has advocated a much harsher response totheir activities and has proposed a 
new Anti-Terrorism Bill77that would allow for the detention of suspects for14 days and 
the banning of organizations like PAGAD. 
In discussing community responses to crime it is important to remember thatthe recourse 
to violent action outside the formal institutions of the state is awell-established principle 
in South Africa. Indeed, a “culture of violence” canbe said to exist in which society 
endorses and accepts violence as an acceptableand legitimate means to resolve not only 
problems but also to achieve goals.78 The Reverend Frank Chikane wrote in 1987 that 
“themost tragic reflection of [the] war situation in which South Africa finds itselfis that it 
faces the years to come with children who have been socialised tofind violence 
completely acceptable and human life cheap.”79 In the period before the unbanning of the 
ANC and thelifting of the state of emergency (February 1990) much of the conflict 
andviolence was driven by township residents’ opposition to apartheid and theirattempts 
to make the townships ungovernable. This included rent, services andconsumer boycotts, 
worker stayaways, protest marches and mass mobilization. Thestate responded by 
imposing a state of emergency and clamped down on overtpolitical activity thus leading 
to confrontation between township residents andthe security forces. The period leading 
up to democracy (1990-94) wascharacterized by both inter- and intra-community 
violence facilitated by thederegulation of the repressive state security forces and the 
legitimization ofviolence by all political groupings prior to the 1990s.80 In democratic 
South Africa violence is endemic andcan be found in almost all parts of social life, 
including attacks againstillegal aliens and xenophobia, campus violence, domestic 
violence, minibus taxi“wars” and violent crime.81  Thus the sjambokking of “skollies” 
(local hoodlums)by organized groups such as Mapogo or the coming together of 
concerned communitymembers like taxi-drivers or ex-combatants has become common 
place in thetownships in the “new” South Africa. 
CONCLUSIONS 
What “lessons,” if any, can Northern Ireland draw from the South Africanexperience? 
Firstly, the implementation of reforms needs to involve a “wholepackage” approach. The 
police reforms in South Africa have addressed the problemof legitimacy but new 
problems of effectiveness and transparency have emerged.The “new” police service 
established in 1995 has inherited many of the personnelrecruited during the apartheid 
years, some of whom are badly trained andeducated. It is estimated that 25 percent are 
illiterate and around 13 percentdo not hold a driver’s licence, although the ability to read 
and write andpossess a formal driver’s licence are requirements of the South African 
PoliceServices Act.82 The service also suffers from a lack of resources,detective training 
and high absenteeism. The creation of Community PolicingForums and encouragement 
of community involvement also appears to be a rathersuperficial measure given the 
general lack of resources and, in some cases,police antagonism to civilian scrutiny. The 
introduction of lay assessors atmagistrate court level was designed to allow the 
community a greater say inmatters of concern to them. Much confusion exists about the 
scheme and itappears to be haphazardly applied, working in some areas and not in others. 
Thelow levels of state aid to people without work in addition to the high levels 
ofunemployment exacerbate the crime situation in the townships. For some, crime isthe 
only option if they are to survive. Unless economic reforms are implementedto alleviate 
levels of poverty and deprivation then crime will continue to be aproblem in the 
townships. Secondly, on the issue of community restorativejustice the townships have a 
long history of such an approach and even in thosetownships where it is operating 
successfully, instances of retributive informaljustice still occur. Community restorative 
justice projects are a relativelyrecent approach in Northern Ireland and there is no 
guarantee that they willwork or result in a cessation of “punishment” attacks. Thirdly, in 
South Africathe police are now accepted as legitimate but a culture of violence 
persists.The “comrades” may no longer “police” the townships but other groupings 
haveemerged who are willing to mete out their version of justice and/or retrievestolen 
goods, thus bypassing the formal criminal justice system. A negotiatedpeace that results 
in the community accepting the formal system does notnecessarily mean that the 
utilization of often “successful” methods ofretributive informal justice will be abandoned. 
This is particularly relevant inNorthern Ireland where progress towards a post-conflict 
society is dependent onovercoming obstacles to police reform, demilitarization and 
decommissioning ofparamilitary arms. In circumstances where reform of the key organs 
of crimeprevention, the police and criminal justice system, are inextricably bound tothe 
faltering political process, then communities will continue to seek redressthrough the 
paramilitaries. For those in Northern Ireland and South Africaweaned on political 
violence, the promise of a robust and effective formalsystem of criminal justice seems a 
rather remote prospect. In the meantime, thealternative informal system continues, 
sustained by a demand from communitiesconditioned to violence who endorse, without 
necessarily agreeing, with itsexcesses. The key lesson for Northern Ireland is that 
political, constitutionaland criminal justice reforms must operate in tandem to restore 
confidence incommunities that real change is taking place. There must be an acceptance 
thatsuch change will not happen overnight and the process is fragile and subject 
toscrutiny by those suspicious of its effectiveness. Any hint that the guarantorsof change 
(e.g. Equality Commission, Police Ombudsman, Patten)83are being frustrated in their 
efforts, will simplyreinforce community mistrust and reassert their reliance on 
paramilitaries. Theultimate goal is the transition from “an acceptable level of violence” to 
realpeace. 
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